Delivering a competitive Australian power system Part 3: a better way to competitive power in 2035 by Foster, John et al.
Delivering a competitive 
Australian power system
Part 3: A better way to competitive 
power in 2035
October 2013
Delivering a competitive Australian power system Part 3: A better way to competitive power in 20352
Table of contents 
Executive summary 3
1. Introduction 6
2. Policy for greater resilience 10
 2.1 The Energy White Paper’s policy for resilience 11
 2.2 100 percent renewable energy policy for resilience 11
 2.3 Policies to increase resilience 12
  2.3.1 Case study: Germany 12
  2.3.2 Case study: China 15
  2.3.3 Case study: California 17
  2.3.4 Case study: Australia 19
  2.3.5 Comparisons 23
3. A transition to resilient power 26
 3.1 Implementing incentives to deliver a resilience strategy 28
  3.1.1 The emissions trading and carbon tax theories 29
  3.1.2 Gaps between theory and applications in the real world 29
  3.1.3 Plugging the gap between the theory and real world  30 
   application 
  3.1.4 Real world incentives for diverse energy in Australia 31
  3.1.5 Why we need to fund differentiated Power Purchase  31 
   Agreements from a carbon price
  3.1.6 How it might work 32
 3.2 What others have said 34
 3.3 Research to underpin affordability and innovation in energy 35
4. The need for a strategic system view 40
References 42
List of figures 43
List of tables 43
Authors
John Foster, Craig Froome,  
Chris Greig, Ove Hoegh-
Guldberg, Paul Meredith,  
Lynette Molyneaux, Tapan Saha, 
Liam Wagner, Barry Ball
Reference Group
Peta Ashworth (CSIRO),  
Quentin Grafton (Australian 
National University), Paul 
Greenfield, Mark Grenning  
(Rio Tinto), Magnus Hindsberger 
(Australian Energy Market 
Operator), Ken McAlpine (Vestas), 
Ian McLeod (Ergon Energy),  
Alan Millis (Queensland 
Department of Energy and  
Water Supply), Greg Nielsen 
(Ergon Energy), Keith Orchison, 
Cameron O’Reilly (Electricity 
Retailers Association),  
Paul Simshauser (AGL)
Note: Reference Group members 
have provided a forum for 
discussion about Australian 
power issues. This does not 
imply their approval of the views 
expressed in this paper.
 
3October 2013
It is important for Australia to pursue a 
strategy of diversity in power generation 
technologies and energy sources to keep 
options open for the future and initiate  
climate change mitigation measures.
Executive summary
Delivering a competitive Australian power system Part 3: A better way to competitive power in 20354
This paper, the final in a three-
part series examining the 
competitiveness of Australia’s 
power system, seeks to identify  
a pragmatic strategy to transition 
Australia to a resilient power 
economy at reasonable cost 
and in an age of uncertainty.
Background
The resilience of a country’s 
power economy refers to its 
ability to meet power 
requirements while withstanding 
supply shocks and environmental 
constraints. For a country’s 
power economy to be 
competitive, it must be both 
affordable and resilient.
This series examines the 
competitiveness of Australia’s 
power economy and evaluates 
possible strategies for securing 
the nation’s power economy  
into the future. In Part 1, 
(published December 2011),  
we demonstrated that Australia’s 
power system was not resilient, 
with higher electricity prices  
than most competing countries. 
Various scenarios for Australia’s 
power future were the focus in 
Part 2 (published February 2013). 
Our analysis found that shifting  
to gas from coal power 
generation did not address this 
vulnerability but could instead 
lead to large price increases. 
Rather, a portfolio approach  
to investing in electricity 
generation will ensure Australia 
starts to build a power system 
that is more robust, and thus 
more competitive, in the years  
to come.
The solution
While market structures are 
well-suited to factoring risk into 
investment decisions, electricity 
generation in Australia faces 
multiple layers of uncertainty  
and external costs which can 
deflect the market from efficient 
outcomes. For this reason,  
it is important for Australia to 
pursue a strategy of diversity in 
power generation technologies 
and energy sources to keep 
options open for the future and 
initiate climate change mitigation 
measures. 
The best way to achieve both 
resilience and cost 
competitiveness in Australia’s 
power system is to develop a 
strategy that pursues the middle 
ground. In this paper, Part 3 of 
the series, we use the Power 
System Resilience Index 
developed in Part 1 to compare 
German, Chinese and Californian 
energy policies with Australia.  
We ask how effective they are in 
achieving greater diversity and,  
in this way, resilience in electricity.
We find that Feed-in-Tariffs  
have been largely successful  
at achieving diversified 
generation; but that shifting 
generation to domestic and  
small business consumers – 
what we call “democratising” 
generation – imposes a cost 
burden on consumers. 
To achieve a competitive and 
resilient power system, Australian 
strategy needs to focus on:
•  Increasing the diversity of its 
energy fleet
•  Decreasing the carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions of its energy 
fleet
•  Increasing the security of its 
fleet through robust storage 
options
•  Improving the distribution 
efficiency of its power system
Specific policy measures to 
achieve these goals should:
•  Reduce reliance on coal-fired 
generation. The Renewable 
Energy Target (RET) and the 
carbon price legislation have 
been fairly successful in 
encouraging investment in 
alternative forms of generation, 
although potential changes to 
both of these policy levers 
threaten their ongoing 
effectiveness. Also, the current 
structures of the RET and 
carbon price do not encourage 
investment in energy sources 
other than wind and gas.
•  Regulate that new coal-fired 
plant can only be licensed if it 
meets world class efficiency 
and environmental standards 
and is fitted with Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS).
•  Invest in community 
consultation with respect to 
acceptance of nuclear power, 
and the siting studies and 
regulatory frameworks required 
to enable a future option for 
nuclear power generation.
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•  Encourage participation in 
global research and 
development communities 
where a technological option 
exists but is as yet too 
expensive or too immature to 
deploy. This will keep the 
options open while Australia 
benefits from the knowledge 
gained from the combined 
research efforts of a multitude 
of larger nations.
•  Foster bipartisan support to 
fund and direct the deployment 
of those technologies available 
now to benefit from increased 
diversity of generation, as well 
as reduced carbon emissions.
•  Pursue pragmatic actions 
by using small, incremental 
steps (which are simpler to 
fund and implement than  
large, transformative change) 
to work towards the strategic 
goal of greater power system 
resilience. 
Based on our findings, we are 
making two key proposals: 
Proposal 1: Funds from 
polluters should be used to 
invest directly in utility scale CO2 
abatement, diversity and 
resilience to reduce emissions 
and minimise costs to 
consumers
Proposal 2: Australia must 
invest in energy innovation for 
economic growth. Australia’s 
power industry has successfully 
exploited its local domestic 
resources of coal but this has 
resulted in too little diversity and 
very high levels of CO2 
emissions. It is now timely to 
invest in other local resources for 
greater resilience.
The first key proposal requires  
a bipartisan approach.  
We recommend overlaying an 
incentive mechanism, similar to 
the Liberal-National Coalition’s 
proposed approach, on top of 
the funding mechanism that the 
Labor Government has 
implemented. In this way, both 
major parties will have 
contributed to meaningful policy 
formulation, supplying essential 
policy measures which together 
will help position Australia’s 
power system to meet climate 
change objectives and reduce 
vulnerability to energy and 
carbon shocks.
The second proposal continues 
the thinking started in the 
Australian Government’s 2008 
Cutler Report, and advanced in 
the 2011 Clean Energy Futures 
package, which supports 
investment in Australia’s ability to 
innovate and reap the benefits 
from research. Pursuing this 
course of action would provide 
Australia with a remarkable 
opportunity to build a detailed 
regional development plan 
structured around innovation and 
the development of local energy 
sources in every state. 
 
An increased focus on energy efficiency and 
uptake of rooftop photovoltaics (solar panels) 
has reduced growth in energy demand but the 
impact on load growth in the longer term is 
still unknown.
Introduction1.
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In the first installment of this 
series, “Part 1: Australia’s global 
position”, we defined and 
constructed a metric to compare, 
systematically and rationally,  
the efficiency, diversity and 
security of national power 
systems which we called the 
Power System Resilience Index. 
We used the Index to compare 
Australia’s power economy with 
its closest competitors and in 
doing so found that Australian 
power was not cheap, resilient  
or competitive (Ball et al., 2011).
Since 1990, most other  
countries have improved their 
resilience, generally through 
greater diversification of energy 
sources. Spain, in particular,  
has reduced its reliance on fossil 
fuels, reduced emissions and 
increased diversity of energy 
sources. 
However, Australia, France and 
South Africa remain largely reliant 
on power from a single source, 
making them vulnerable to 
shocks in energy supply (and 
carbon costs, in the cases of 
Australia and South Africa) which 
lead to higher electricity prices 
and thus a lack of 
competitiveness in attracting 
electricity-intensive investment.
It became clear in the second 
part of the series, “Part 2:  
The challenges, the scenarios”, 
that shifting from coal-fired to 
gas-fired power was unlikely to 
improve resilience, cost 
competitiveness or gross 
emissions by 2035. Other key 
findings in Part 2 included:
•  Carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) and nuclear investment 
would improve resilience and 
emissions reductions but 
longer-term global investment 
in research, development and 
deployment is needed to make 
the technology affordable. 
Even then, CCS might still not 
be competitive with the lowest 
cost renewable alternatives. 
•  The deployment of nuclear 
power relies on winning over 
an uncertain public after the 
problems experienced in 
Fukushima in 2011 and the 
likely time-consuming task of 
finding a suitable site for plants.
•  Investing in distributed 
(electricity generated from 
many small energy sources) 
and renewable generation 
would deliver resilience, 
emissions reductions and an 
energy profile that the public is 
likely to support but this 
depends on cost, security of 
supply, size and location of the 
generation projects. In relation 
to security of supply, research 
and development is required to 
deliver new cost effective 
storage technologies and to 
resolve potential network 
instability issues associated 
with intermittent generation. 
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Figure 1: Power System Resilience, 2010 versus 1990
Source: (IEA, 2013, IEA, 2012). 
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•  Pursuing renewable and 
distributed generation 
addressed more of the 
challenges facing the industry, 
although options to deploy 
nuclear power and CCS 
should be kept open to ensure 
that deep emission reductions 
can be attained if necessary 
(Foster et al., 2013).
In this third paper, we seek to 
identify a pragmatic strategy to 
transition Australia to a resilient 
power economy at reasonable 
cost in an age of uncertainty.  
We focus on uncertainty 
because the provision of power 
in Australia faces multiple levels 
of uncertainty. These include:
Future carbon constraints 
and worldwide demand for 
coal
The predicted effect of carbon 
emissions on seas and 
ecosystems has been widely 
ignored in favour of continued 
development of fossil fuel 
resources. While the fossil fuel 
industries may not agree, the 
Carbon Tracker Initiative claims 
that current investment decisions 
are not factoring in the risk 
associated with future carbon 
constraints and the vulnerability 
of Australian coal investment,  
in particular, to reduced revenues 
if global demand for coal falls 
sharply. This could result in the 
emergence of expensive 
stranded assets in coal and gas 
production (Carbon Tracker and 
The Climate Institute, 2013).
International policies and 
growth of other nations
Globalisation has heightened 
competition, placing pressure on 
costs, so Australia faces an 
uncertain investment future 
dependent often on the policies 
and growth of other nations, 
rather than domestic policies.
Impact of growing bills on 
low income budgets
Growing Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has not delivered 
greater equality, so Australians 
on the lowest incomes face 
uncertainty about how to fund 
growing household bills.
Political uncertainty and 
unpredictable markets
Voters give conflicting messages 
to politicians who deliver policies 
that have an uncertain tenure 
because they lack bipartisan 
support. Consequently, policy 
has moved away from regulation 
towards the use of market 
measures which reduce 
regulatory risk but introduce 
uncertainty in both effect and 
cost because the market 
response is unpredictable.
Carbon pricing
The proposed link to an 
international emissions trading 
scheme in Australia in 2014 or 
2015 is forecast to decrease  
the carbon price for Australia. 
New investment in coal-fired 
generation will be unlikely and 
CO2 emissions will not increase 
if demand for energy remains low 
and the Australian Government’s 
Renewable Energy Target 
continues to encourage 
renewable energy investment. 
However, to reduce emissions 
there must be a shift away from 
coal-fired generation which will 
require a much higher carbon 
price than current market 
projections. A much higher 
carbon price will result in 
significant uncertainty for the 
power industry, and the 
Australian economy as a whole.
Table 1: Forces driving the power system and how the different scenarios 
address these forces
Forces driving the 
power system 
Ability to address forces driving the system
Scenarios Base Non-Renewable 
Centralised Power 
Changing Technological 
Landscape 
Business-as-
Usual
Carbon 
capture and 
storage
Nuclear Renewables Consumer 
action 
Rising prices
Fuel
Distribution
Carbon 
constraints 
Infrastructure 
renewal
Public support for 
renewables
Technology shift 
to renewables 
and distributed 
generation 
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Changing energy behaviour
Evidence has emerged following 
major shocks from electricity 
price increases and the global 
financial crisis that behaviour 
driving electricity demand growth 
and load shape has changed.  
An increased focus on energy 
efficiency and uptake of rooftop 
photovoltaics (solar panels) has 
reduced growth in energy 
demand but the impact on load 
growth in the longer term is still 
unknown. Developing strategies 
for the long term under these 
circumstances is difficult.
The challenges of 
transformation
Changing to renewable and 
distributed generation presents 
management and engineering 
challenges for institutions and 
systems as the technological 
landscape is transformed. 
Utilities, meanwhile, will face 
financial consequences and 
require affordable capital and 
shareholder returns to make the 
change. This will lead to an 
uncertain and conflicted power 
system strategy, as consumers, 
utilities and shareholders will 
jostle to gain advantage, drawing 
on strategic responses that are 
yet to emerge.
So, what’s the best way to 
develop a strategy in an 
environment of heightened 
uncertainty?
In understanding how to deal 
with uncertainty, we have drawn 
on the work of Austrian physicist 
and philosopher Ludwig 
Boltzmann and surprisal theory. 
In very broad terms, surprise is 
what probability is not. 
If something is highly probable it 
is not surprising. 
To deal effectively with surprise  
it is important to move away  
from a single way of doing things 
and embrace diversity and spare 
capacity (Ulanowicz et al. 2009). 
This can be understood  
in terms of robustness – 
spreading your risk across a 
number of approaches – and 
responsiveness – the ability to 
switch to an alternative if your 
current approach breaks down.
It is important, therefore,  
to pursue diversity in both  
energy sources and policy 
implementation. Australia needs 
a technological portfolio  
strategy that keeps its options 
open, and avoids the trap of an 
energy impasse like that 
experienced by Japan after the 
1970s (Molyneaux et al., 2012).  
By pursuing multiple policy 
options as a bipartisan strategy 
for Australian power, Australia  
will better prepare the power 
system and the economy  
for unpredictable future energy-
related shocks. 
We seek in this paper to identify 
policy that will deliver effective 
incremental steps to help achieve 
these goals, ensuring there is 
sufficient flexibility to manage 
change over multiple decades. 
This series seeks to find the middle ground for 
shifting towards greater resilience, using the 
existing infrastructure to provide a foundation 
for, and reduce the cost of, a transformation 
to a sustainable, resilient power system.
Policy for greater 
resilience
2.
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2.1 The Energy White 
Paper’s policy for 
resilience
The Australian Energy White 
Paper released in 2012 outlined 
the Government’s strategy 
proposed for energy provision to 
2050. It stresses the importance 
of reducing emissions associated 
with electricity generation while 
maintaining competitive prices. 
However, it advocates a relatively 
light regulatory approach, 
choosing to pursue an 
internationally-linked market 
mechanism after the more 
prescriptive 20 percent 
Renewable Energy Target (RET) 
expires in 2020. 
The paper’s proposed critical 
market mechanism is the carbon 
price, which is expected to 
internalise the cost of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions 
sufficiently to divert investment  
to clean(er) electricity generation. 
It proposes assistance for 
deploying immature technologies 
be provided either through 
institutional support from the 
Australian Renewable Energy 
Agency (ARENA), funding 
assistance for investment 
through the Clean Energy 
Finance Corporation (CEFC) or 
direct financial assistance for 
industrial scale demonstration of 
Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) and solar power through 
their respective government-
funded flagship programs. 
The Energy White Paper cautions 
against infrastructure lock-in, and 
advocates a portfolio approach 
to electricity provision with a 
requirement to strengthen the 
resilience of the policy 
framework. However, it proposes 
Australia relies on a single market 
mechanism to deliver diversity 
and CO2 emission reduction and 
focusses on the cheapest 
abatement option. In so doing it 
delivers neither diversity nor 
resilience.
Part 1 of this series showed  
that resilience requires not only 
efficiency, but also the more 
prescriptive elements of diversity 
and spare capacity. Investment 
projections to meet CO2 
emission reductions rely on 
ambitious international CO2 
permit prices. Considering the 
structural problems underlying 
current levels of the European 
Union’s Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) CO2 permit 
prices, it is worrying that more 
supportive measures to reduce 
uncertainty, ensure diversity or 
reduce emissions to boost 
resilience and meet ambitious 
CO2 emission abatement goals, 
are not evident. 
The Energy White Paper is based 
on a reliance on markets to 
stimulate innovation, offer better 
services and deliver adequate 
resources and investment. In 
fact, the market is to be the final 
arbiter on the provision of all 
services and strategies for 
energy in Australia. In terms of 
electricity, the paper states that 
electricity market reform has 
delivered competitively-priced 
electricity and it seeks to 
encourage full deregulation of  
the power system to complete 
the shift to private enterprise 
unfettered by government 
inadequacies. 
From a policy perspective,  
a lack of transparency around 
the actual prices consumers  
pay makes it impossible to 
ascertain whether the move 
away from a regulated standing 
offer tariff has delivered benefits 
for Victorian consumers. 
Proceeding with deregulation in 
the rest of the states without 
greater transparency around the 
outcomes would not be based 
on sound evidence and is 
unlikely to stimulate investment 
for diversity and resilience.
2.2 100 percent 
renewable energy 
policy for resilience
As part of its Clean Energy 
Future Plan, the Australian 
Government commissioned the 
Australian Energy Market 
Operator (AEMO) to undertake a 
feasibility study into a power 
system reliant only on renewable 
energy, entitled the “100% 
Renewables Study”. AEMO’s 
draft modeling outcome included 
multiple caveats around the 
uncertain nature of predicting  
the performance of immature 
technologies based on 
hypothetical advances in 
efficiency and performance. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, 
the study suggested that under  
a 100 percent renewable energy 
system, operational issues 
appear manageable, and 
demand and load patterns are 
likely to evolve subject to the 
deployment of distributed and 
renewable generation.
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It found that a wide range of 
technologies and locations and 
very high levels of capacity 
reserves would be required to 
meet reliability standards. 
Diversity in sources of fuel and 
technology, and high levels of 
spare capacity, are highly 
desirable for resilience, so the 
AEMO’s observations suggest  
a positive outcome for power 
system resilience. 
Importantly, the report highlights 
that: 
•  It has not modeled how a 
transition to 100 percent 
renewable energy might be 
achieved
•  High reserve capacity is 
required to back-up 
intermittent renewable 
generation
•  The potential for stranding 
existing assets will impose high 
costs on the system. 
On this basis, this series seeks  
to find the middle ground for 
shifting towards greater 
resilience, using the existing 
infrastructure to provide a 
foundation for, and reduce the 
cost of, a transformation to a 
sustainable, resilient power 
system. Where the capacity 
requirements for generation in 
2030 in the 100% Renewables 
Study are between 83GW and 
98GW through investing in new 
plants, our modeling showed  
that investing in between 43GW 
and 52GW of new plant facilities 
could achieve high levels of 
resilience. 
2.3 Policies to 
increase resilience
Looking to Europe can help us to 
understand the impact of policy 
on power systems. Germany,  
in particular, is undergoing 
remarkable change, largely due 
to increased diversity of energy 
sources and a shift to renewable 
forms of energy. The following 
section provides an analysis of  
a few notable countries’ policies 
implemented to increase 
renewable energy deployment 
and resilience. We do not hold 
these case studies out as 
exemplars of policy 
implementation for power 
economy competitiveness, but 
rather use them to examine a 
range of approaches to achieving 
greater power system resilience.
2.3.1. Case-study: Germany 
In Germany, renewable energy 
has grown from three percent in 
1990 in the form of hydro energy 
to 18 percent in 2010, including 
eight percent biomass, five per 
cent wind and two per cent solar. 
The target is 36 percent by 2020. 
According to our Power System 
Resilience Index, German energy 
resilience has increased 
significantly from 1990 to 2010.
The trend
The shift away from coal and 
nuclear to gas and renewables 
reduced Germany’s consumption 
of non-renewable energy in 
electricity generation, improving 
the metrics for energy use, 
carbon emissions, diversity and 
generation efficiency. Electricity 
dependent on imported fuels 
and imported electricity 
increased from 15 percent in 
1990 to 54 percent in 2010, 
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Figure 2: Power System Resilience in Germany, 2010 versus 1990
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notably gas, coal and uranium, 
so the focus on domestic 
renewable resources is logical  
to improve energy security.
Germany has pursued 
diversification by guaranteeing 
remuneration to investors for 
renewable and distributed 
generation through Feed-in-
Tariffs (FiTs) and through 
research and support for 
innovation. The FiT mechanism 
dates back to 1991 and took  
the form of a supply contract 
between a generator and the 
system operator, usually for  
20 years. 
The first version of the FiT law, 
Stromeinspeisungsgesetz  
(StrEG) triggered wind power 
development by granting  
priority to wind turbines in rural 
areas and providing investor 
security through stable pricing. 
This provided a mechanism to 
stimulate investment and 
innovation in different geographic 
areas. Introduced in 2000,  
the German Renewable Energy 
Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-
Gesetz or EEG) differentiated 
support according to  
technology maturity, size and 
site. A subsequent revision to  
the feed-in law in 2004 provided 
momentum to solar and 
biomass. In May 2010, Germany 
reduced the support level from 
43 cents (c) to 33c/kWh for 
photovoltaic (PV) feed-in, and 
introduced a target corridor for 
expected annual growth of 
3.5GW. 
Germany sets an annual 
degression rate, which is a 
percentage decrease payment 
over time at a pre-determined 
rate or according to level of 
installations and technology  
used (Hinrichs-Rahlwes, 2013; 
Huenteler et al., 2012; Wand  
and Leithold, 2011; Weigt, 2009).
Guaranteed prices for a fixed 
period are differentiated 
according to the type of 
technology, size of the 
installation, quality of the 
resource, and location of the 
project. This approach enabled  
a greater number and diversity  
of investors to participate and 
stimulated rapid renewable 
energy deployment in a wide 
variety of technologies. 
Significant private, residential 
investment has resulted, 
facilitating a shift towards 
democratisation of electricity 
supply. Renewable energy is 
generally immune to global 
energy market volatilities and 
inflation in fuel price and has 
been found to have a price-
deflating influence on electricity 
wholesale markets (Weigt, 
2009b; Würzburg et al., 2013; 
AEMO, 2012b). 
Feed-in-Tariffs
FiTs have become the most 
widely used policy instrument to 
promote renewable energy 
deployment. Their success 
comes from the inherent revenue 
certainty for investors and the 
guaranteed grid access for 
electricity from renewable energy. 
There are few empirical studies 
on the cost-effectiveness of FiT 
schemes, possibly due to the 
complexity of the policy design 
and the lack of appropriate data. 
The World Bank has analysed 
FiT for wind in Europe and found 
that high revenue returns have 
not yielded greater deployment 
of wind power (Zhang, 2013). 
Earlier studies pointed to the 
inherent problems with setting  
an optimal tariff that avoids 
excessive profit margins, 
enhances economic efficiency, 
promotes technology and 
achieves desired targets 
(Madlener and Stagl, 2000). 
More recently, the Australian 
Productivity Commission 
released a report comparing 
carbon emission policies in key 
economies, including Germany, 
and concluded that FiT schemes 
in Germany provided abatement 
at considerably higher costs than 
abatement from the EU ETS 
(Productivity Commission, 2011). 
The Productivity Commission’s 
finding, however, requires 
clarification. Since its inception, 
the EU ETS permit price has 
traded at levels that could only 
secure abatement from fuel 
switching from coal to gas.  
As a result of Germany’s lack of 
gas-fired baseload capacity, 
Germany was unable to benefit 
from fuel switching and thus 
sought abatement opportunities 
from more expensive options 
which required investment in new 
capacity and new technologies. 
The majority of academic 
analysis of the roll-out of 
renewable energy in the EU 
indicate that well-adapted FiT 
regimes are generally effective 
support schemes for promoting 
renewable energy (Haas et al; 
2011, Batlle et al; 2012, Couture 
and Gagnon, 2010). Residential 
consumers pay a renewable 
energy levy which funds the FiTs, 
leading the EU to question 
whether industrial consumers are 
benefiting unfairly. 
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While the FiT has led to a sharp 
increase in renewable energy 
capacity, the roll-out of high 
levels of intermittent generation 
has had its technical challenges. 
In particular, grid congestion  
and security issues on both the 
main transmission network and 
the distribution network which 
experiences intermittent  
bi-directional power flow 
problems has required grid 
upgrades, unearthed many 
innovative operational solutions, 
and relied heavily on investments 
in research and development.
German government and 
industry have both invested 
heavily in research, development 
and deployment as a result of the 
technological challenges 
associated with the roll-out of 
novel energy technologies.  
More than €400 million per year 
of funding was made available for 
the advancement of renewable 
energy, fusion, efficiency and 
storage in the Fifth Energy 
Research Programme 
“Innovation and New Energy 
Technologies” from 2005 to 2010 
to meet the requirements for 
secure, affordable energy and to 
mitigate against climate change 
(Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology, 2005). 
Investment in innovation and 
innovative capacity has:
•  Increased employment in the 
renewable energy industry 
from 100,000 in 2000 to 
382,000 in 2011
•  Encouraged investment in new 
renewable energy of €19.5 
billion in 2012 (€165.7 billion 
since 2000), more than half of 
which has come from private 
individuals and farmers
•  Facilitated €12 billion of exports 
in plant and technology in 
2008 (German Renewable 
Energies Agency, 2013)
Conclusions
The introduction of renewable 
energy into the generation fleet 
along with the democratisation  
of generation has impacted the 
German power industry in a 
number of ways. Residential 
energy prices have risen sharply 
to support generous FiTs,  
while wholesale prices have 
decreased, reflecting the impact 
of very low marginal cost 
generation on a market designed 
for traditional forms of fossil-fuel 
fired generation. 
Potentially disruptive technology 
has been implemented at high 
concentrations leading to 
significant grid congestion and 
network security problems which 
have needed resolving, not in the 
laboratory, but in a challenging 
operational environment. 
Revenues have shifted away 
from traditional industry 
participants to voters - 
householders, farmers, small 
communities and businesses. 
This democratisation of a 
significant portion of the industry 
has resulted in industry 
participants and electricity 
intensive industry seeking to 
wind back the policies for greater 
stability in the industry, and pitted 
the industry against voters who 
have invested heavily in the new 
structure. This is evidence of an 
industry and a country in the 
throes of change.
The lesson from the German 
energy transition (Energiewende) 
is that unleashing a disruptive 
democratisation process 
alongside a disruptive technology 
increases volatility and 
uncertainty, and ultimately may 
deflect a well-intentioned strategy 
from its intended pathway. 
Despite this, innovation policy 
has played a substantial part in 
building a renewable energy 
industry and helping to resolve 
operational issues as they arise.
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2.3.2. Case study: China
Renewable energy in the Chinese 
power system has remained 
largely unchanged at 15 percent 
hydro in 1990 to 1 percent wind 
and 14 percent hydro in 2010. 
China has a renewable energy 
target of 20 percent by 2015. 
According to our Power System 
Resilience Index, Chinese energy 
resilience has increased 
significantly from 1990 to 2010.
The trend
The metrics for non-renewable 
energy use and carbon use 
reflect China’s enormous 
investment in new coal-fired 
generation (including retirement 
of inefficient plants) which has 
delivered energy use efficiency 
improvements and reduced 
carbon emissions. The new plant 
investment has improved the 
spare capacity metric, while 
investment in transmission has 
improved the metric for 
distribution efficiency. 
While China’s route to resilience 
improvement differs from 
Germany’s, its plans for the 
future include a focus on diversity 
and the environment, which will 
serve to strengthen its resilience 
metrics further. 
China’s energy policy as per  
the Twelfth Five-Year plan (2011-
2015) is focused on:
• Giving priority to conservation
• Relying on domestic resources
•  Encouraging diverse 
development
• Protecting the environment
• Promoting innovation
• Deepening reform
•  Expanding international  
co-operation
• Improving people’s livelihoods
A reliable and secure electricity 
supply is strongly linked to the 
Chinese government’s 
fundamentals for policy-making, 
in particular social stability and 
economic growth. For this 
reason, China has sought to 
exploit its coal reserves for 
domestic power generation. 
Imperfect supply chain
China has increased coal-fired 
power generation since 1990 by 
575GW, but faces challenges 
around its coal supply chain. 
Coal mines are often far-removed 
from generation, which means 
that severe conditions in winter 
can block deliveries of coal. 
Recent sluggish demand for  
coal has reduced some of these 
logistical problems. Increasing 
prices for coal, meanwhile,  
have placed substantial financial 
pressure on utilities and state-
controlled grid corporations 
responsible for delivering 
electricity at Government-
regulated tariffs. 
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A focus on efficiency has led to 
the closure of many smaller, less 
efficient but flexible coal-fired 
power stations which have been 
useful in load-balancing. 
Concerns regarding the high 
price of gas and the security of 
supply have muted investment in 
gas-fired generation. Gas-fired 
generation has, therefore, 
focused on power system 
balancing rather than base-load 
supply.
Renewable energy
China has not focused only on 
investment in modern coal-fired 
generation. The Renewable 
Energy Law requires grid 
operators to buy renewable 
energy and provides the national 
renewable energy fund, 
discounted lending and 
preferential tax treatment for 
renewable energy projects. It has 
facilitated the deployment of 
161GW of hydro, and 45GW of 
wind, in addition to 33GW of gas 
and 11GW of nuclear since 1990. 
China now plans to rapidly 
increase the share of electricity 
generated from renewable 
sources. Targets for 2015 include 
adding 93GW of hydro, 55GW  
of wind, 30GW of nuclear and 
28GW of solar. The Renewable 
Energy Law was amended in 
2010 to co-ordinate grid planning 
with wind power generation to 
ensure that the wind power 
generated is used effectively.  
In addition, state owned 
generators are focused on 
developing wind power to 
increase market share, access 
Clean Development Mechanism 
revenue and reduce reliance on 
unprofitable coal-fired generation. 
China’s 2012 energy policy lists 
the importance of promoting and 
developing distributed energy, 
and supporting innovation and 
research and development.
State-owned grid companies
China’s power system is 
dominated by the state-owned 
grid companies, State Grid 
Corporation of China (SGCC); 
China South Grid Company 
(CSGC); and Western Inner 
Mongolia Grid Corporation.  
They are responsible for 
constructing and running  
trans-regional transmission, 
interconnection, ancillary 
reserves, capacity planning, 
dispatching and trading between 
26 regional power networks. 
They are not compensated for 
maintaining reserves, must 
purchase energy from generators 
and provide power to consumers 
at government-specified tariffs. 
Underlying the ambitious targets 
for wind and hydro power is an 
acceptance of the state grid 
companies’ responsibility to build 
a “unified strong and smart grid” 
nationwide by 2020 with an 
ultra-high-voltage network at its 
core. This network development 
requires the provision of a larger 
balancing area for wind power 
deployed in the north of the 
country and the hydro power in 
the south-west of the country, 
with much already underway.  
In 2009 an estimated $US55 
billion was invested in power 
transmission. Although small by 
comparison, storage includes 
current pumped hydro capacity 
of 14GW with 60GW planned by 
2020; and a significant 
investment in joint ventures with 
American battery companies to 
develop many different 
technologies and production 
facilities. 
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Using the state-controlled grid 
companies to control the power 
system has ensured that China 
has met its targets and kept 
prices down to sustain  
economic growth. However,  
the targets were met subject to 
significant difficulties. Firstly, 
there is little incentive for SGCC 
and CSGC to co-operate as  
they have separate profit targets. 
This has minimised the benefit  
of a freely flowing network 
infrastructure. Secondly, quantity 
and prices of electricity are 
agreed to yearly, and are based 
largely on fixed capacity factors, 
with less than 20 percent traded 
outside of annual agreements. 
Variations in actual quantities  
of electricity available as 
opposed to those planned has 
led to substantial discarded  
wind energy with the associated 
revenue and profit loss for the 
generators. In addition, grid 
operators are required to pay 
higher prices for wind energy 
than coal-fired generation so 
there is an inherent incentive  
for grid operators to discard wind 
power in preference to directing 
a ramp down of coal-fired 
generation.
Government response
In response, the National 
Development and Reform 
Council has launched a trial to 
ensure dispatch of power in 
order of merit, thus giving wind, 
solar and hydro priority over 
schedulable generation. The trial 
has met with some resistance 
from coal-fired generators who 
are seeking compensation for 
increased coal consumption, 
reduced plant life and reduced 
revenue, as a result of having to 
run at less than full capacity  
and ramping generation in 
response to demand shifts 
associated with fluctuation in 
renewable electricity supplies 
(Cheung, 2011). 
The institutional structure of 
China’s power system is  
driven by centrally-managed 
target-setting five-year-plans. 
Targets are implemented using 
multiple levels of administration 
which have led to inefficiencies, 
including wasted energy as  
a result of the lack of 
transmission to deliver wind 
power to load centres.  
However, a very stable policy 
environment coupled with  
largely stable financial returns  
for investors in renewable  
energy have enabled a massive 
country like China to reach, and 
exceed, the targets required to 
underpin its economic activity.
Conclusions
China has invested heavily in 
power generation, using a 
command economy to direct 
investment according to centrally 
determined five-year-plans.  
This approach has resulted in 
substantial efficiency 
improvements as well as 
significant roll-out of generation 
from renewable sources.
State control of the grid, 
meanwhile, has enabled China  
to co-ordinate the power system 
according to strategies defined  
in the five-year plans.
2.3.3. Case study: California
Diversity of energy generation in 
California is high, with 28 percent 
from renewable, including  
16 percent hydro; six percent 
geothermal; three percent 
biomass; and three percent wind 
in 2010. California has 
experienced a modest increase 
in resilience, as measured by the 
Power System Resilience Index, 
between 1990 and 2010.
There is now a greater proportion 
of gas in the mix which improves 
the metrics for energy use, 
carbon emissions and generation 
efficiency, but reduces the metric 
for diversity. 
Renewable portfolio 
standards
California, like many states in the 
United States (US), has generally 
used renewable portfolio 
standards (RPS), which are 
similar to Australia’s RETs. These 
have long-term contractual 
obligations to encourage diversity 
of generation. RPS require 
stakeholders to source renewable 
energy from certified units for 
periods of up to 20 years. In the 
US, RPS are pursued in 
preference to FiTs because the 
cost of the scheme is less visible. 
Like Australia, California 
embarked on electricity market 
deregulation in 1998. Two years 
later, higher gas prices, stalled 
planning approvals for required 
new plants, steadily increasing 
demand, transmission 
constraints, limited hydrological 
flows and a multitude of flaws  
in market structure precipitated  
a sustained period of market 
volatility. This subjected 
Californians to electricity black-
outs, substantial electricity price 
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rises, and state bail-outs of the 
two largest privately-owned 
utilities. 
The crisis led to a bi-annual 
Integrated Energy Policy process 
which in 2003 highlighted four 
overarching strategies to reduce 
California’s vulnerability to a 
similar future crisis. 
The strategies are to drive energy 
efficiency; diversify fuels for 
generation; enable consumer 
choice in choosing a retailer;  
and strengthen infrastructure.  
The RPS was seen as the 
centrepiece strategy to diversify 
away from gas-fired generation to 
renewable generation to protect 
against price volatility and help 
stabilise the market. 
The 2012 Integrated Energy Policy 
Update remains committed to the 
same objectives and yet in-state 
generation from gas-fired 
generation has increased from  
45 percent in 1990 to 54 percent 
in 2010, and 61 percent in 2012. 
Multiple changes to RPS targets 
and resistance from utilities to 
California Energy Commission 
renewable energy preference 
strategies has limited the growth 
in generation from non-hydro 
renewable energy from two 
percent in 1990 to three percent 
in 2010, but with a surge to five 
percent in 2012 mainly as a result 
of wind power. 
RPS targets have had to be 
enhanced by the California Solar 
Initiative, with $2.2 billion made 
available in the form of rebates for 
rooftop solar PV installations to 
achieve a target of 1.94GW of 
new solar generation capacity by 
2017. The program is currently 
running ahead of schedule with 
1.2GW already installed. Notably, 
prices paid for solar panels are 
around $6/watt which is 
considerably more than that paid 
in Australia. 
California is also home to 125MW 
of parabolic trough and 370MW 
of tower (demonstration project) 
concentrated solar thermal 
power (CSP) and over 2GW of 
utility-scale PV installations due 
for commissioning before the 
end of 2013. A further 375MW 
CSP (parabolic trough) are due 
for commissioning in 2014, and 
150MW of CSP with integrated 
storage due for commissioning in 
2016. These projects have 
required significant support from 
federal programs.
Conclusions
A high-level assessment of the 
success of the RPS to deliver 
diversification of generation for 
California indicate it has been 
slow to deliver results, even with 
a number of enhancements. 
Targets were recently enhanced 
with rebates for the deployment 
of both rooftop and utility scale 
solar PV and large renewable 
energy projects have required 
significant loans or guarantees 
from governments to get 
underway.  
 
Figure 4: Power System Resilience in California, 2010 versus 1990
Energy Use
Carbon
Diversity
GenEffDistEff
Imports
Redundancy
1990 2010RI California 1990 RI California 2010
0.8
0.6
1.0
0.4
0.2
0
19October 2013
2.3.4. Case study: Australia
Renewable energy in Australia 
was 10 percent (hydro) of power 
generation in 1990, and nine 
percent in 2010, including five 
percent hydro, two percent  
wind and two percent biomass. 
According to the Power Systems 
Resilience Index, energy 
resilience in Australia has 
improved only slightly in 2010 
over 1990.
The efficiency, diversity and 
security measures show little 
change from 1990. Hydro has 
decreased as a proportion of 
generation but gas, biomass  
and wind have filled some of the 
reduction which has led to a 
slight improvement in diversity, 
non-renewable energy-use and 
carbon metrics. 
Renewable Energy Targets
Australia has focused its national 
renewable energy policy on the 
RET. The mandatory RET was 
introduced in 2001 when 
renewable energy made up nine 
percent of electricity generated. 
As part of this program, entities 
that purchased wholesale 
electricity (mainly electricity 
retailers) were required to 
surrender renewable energy 
certificates (RECs) to the Clean 
Energy Regulator each year.  
The program was intended to 
generate an additional 
9,500GWh of electricity from 
renewables by 2010.
In 2009 the RET target was 
increased to 45,000GWh of 
electricity from renewable 
sources by 2020, which is an 
estimated 20 percent of 
electricity generation. 
In addition, the Australian 
Government introduced the Solar 
Credits scheme which provided 
an upfront subsidy for small-scale 
solar panel units in the form of 
five renewable energy certificates. 
The RECs generated through the 
Solar Credits scheme were 
tradable through the REC market, 
and a rapid increase in RECs 
served to dilute the value of RECs 
which in turn discouraged 
investment in large-scale 
renewable energy projects. 
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The Australian Government 
responded by legislating to 
separate the RET into the large-
scale target of 41,000 GWh 
(LRET) and the Small-scale 
Renewable Energy Scheme 
(SRES), which set households 
and businesses a small-scale 
target of 4,000GWh and took 
effect in 2011.
From July 2008, various 
Australian states introduced 
renewable energy policies that 
promoted FiTs for rooftop solar 
PV. Tariffs were set at generous 
levels to encourage domestic 
investment. As in Germany,  
the policies were popular with 
Australian voters. A sharp 
increase in electricity prices and 
a dramatic decline in the cost of 
PV thanks to global production 
investment, spurred significant 
interest. Targets and, more 
importantly, budgets to fund the 
policy were soon overwhelmed 
as 2,186MW (of a cumulative  
total of 2,298MW) was installed 
between 2010 and 2012. 
By the end of 2012, FiTs were 
reduced to an average of 8c/
kWh. In 2012, electricity 
generation from solar PV was 
estimated at 2,368GWh (CEC, 
2012), up from 680GWh in 2011. 
This amounted to approximately 
eight percent of generation from 
renewable sources. 
FiTs have been accused of 
having a disproportionate impact 
on recent electricity price rises. 
Figure 6 shows the size of the 
increases in price from solar FiTs, 
RET and carbon price versus 
those from increased network 
and retail costs between 2010 
and 2013. Queensland network 
prices for 2012/13 included in 
Australian Energy Market 
Commission (AEMC) calculations 
as detailed in Figure 6 were not 
passed through in full but 
accumulated until 2013/14. 
Conversely, Queensland Solar 
Bonus Scheme charges were in 
arrears such that FiTs charges for 
Queensland should have been 
0.7c/kWh instead of the 0.1c/kWh 
as reported by AEMC.  
Policy has directed investment  
in solar PV to domestic home 
owners instead of providing 
incentives to commercial and 
industrial scale opportunities.  
Yet while commercial and 
industrial scale investment in 
solar may have delivered energy 
at a lower cost, the benefits of 
solar PV investment should not 
be overlooked. It has driven a 
promising industry providing 
employment for more than 
17,000 in 2012 and attracting 
investment of more than $8 
billion from 2011 to 2012. It has 
also relieved pressure on the 
Queensland energy network in 
summer as our case study 
demonstrates, reducing:
•  Cost and risk for retailers in 
energy purchases
•  The required investment in 
distribution
•  Wholesale prices from greater 
competition amongst 
generators
Since a particularly hot summer 
in Queensland in 2003/04 
trigged increased use of air-
conditioning, energy companies 
were forced to invest heavily to 
accommodate rising peak 
demand during a few hot 
summer days each year. As solar 
PV generation peaks on hot 
days, it has helped relieve 
pressure on networks, reducing 
cost and risk for retailers in 
energy (CEC, 2012). 
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The carbon price was introduced 
on 1 July 2012, as part of the 
Australian Government’s Clean 
Energy legislation. It set a fixed 
carbon price, starting at $23/
tCO2, which is subject to fixed 
annual increases until 2015 when 
it is linked to international 
emissions trading scheme(s). 
Wholesale prices in the  
National Electricity Market,  
which were generally low and 
constant for two to three years, 
increased predictably in line  
with the expected pass-through 
of the carbon price and a 
downturn in demand for energy. 
The downturn was a result of  
a number of factors, including 
slow economic growth, large 
electricity price increases, 
efficiency measures and 
investment in rooftop solar. 
Approximately 2GW of older,  
high CO2 emitting coal-fired 
generators are either being 
closed or mothballed due to  
the surplus of capacity, coupled 
with the cost burden of the 
carbon price. The introduction  
of the carbon price helped 
continue the trend of decreased 
coal-fired generation, which fell 
from 77 percent in 2006/07 to  
 69 percent in 2011/12. 
Much of the Australian 
Government’s support for 
renewable energy has centred  
on establishing institutional 
structures, with few large-scale 
renewable energy projects 
delivered. For instance, only one 
project has thus far survived the 
Solar Flagships process, and the 
Australian Greenhouse Office 
focused on managing voluntary 
abatement, which was generally 
unsuccessful in delivering 
abatement. 
ARENA was established in 2012 
as part of the Australian 
Government’s Clean Energy 
Future package. It is tasked with 
improving the competitiveness of 
renewable energy technologies 
and increasing the supply of 
renewable energy in Australia. 
ARENA is an independent 
authority with approximately  
$3 billion to provide long-term 
funding and policy certainty for 
the renewable energy industry. 
The Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation (CEFC) is also part  
of the Clean Energy Future 
package. It was established in 
July 2013 to facilitate an 
increased flow of funds for the 
commercialisation and 
deployment of Australian-based 
renewable energy, low emissions 
and energy efficiency 
technologies. CEFC has a 
budget of $2 billion per year to 
invest in clean energy. These 
institutional structures need 
bipartisan support to be 
successful. While the CEFC does 
not have bipartisan support, 
ARENA may be subject to 
budget cuts if the carbon price 
legislation is changed or 
dismantled.
National data for 2012/13 was 
not available at the time of 
writing. AEMO data, however, 
shows that nine percent of 
electricity in the NEM was 
sourced from renewable energy 
during that financial year.  
The Clean Energy Council, which 
adjusts for energy from rooftop 
solar PV and hot water, reports 
that 13 percent of energy was 
from renewable sources in 2012 
(CEC, 2012). 
Current renewable energy 
projects underway indicate 
cumulative deployment of around 
3GW of wind power by the end  
of 2013. With surplus capacity in 
the NEM, however, commitment 
to a further 13.4GW of proposed 
wind projects is slow. AEMO 
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Case study 
A hot day in Queensland
Before solar panels – 2008
In June 2007, the Queensland government restricted water for generation at Tarong, Tarong North and 
Swanbank power stations as a result of the drought, which had lowered dam levels and reduced output from 
the Snowy hydro. The market responded to news of Queensland’s reduced energy capacity by lifting energy 
spot prices to an average of $218/MWh. By December 2007, however, spot prices had returned to an average 
of $41/MWh, buoyed by the commissioning of Kogan Creek and the lifting of water restrictions to Tarong to 
meet the summer demand. At the end of 2007, Queensland had 1MW of solar PV installed. 
The summer of 2007/8 was relatively mild, with just 22 days reaching a maximum of more than 30 degrees 
Celsius (°C) and only one day where the maximum exceeded 35°C in Brisbane. However, Saturday, 23 
February was particularly hot, with a maximum of 39.5°C. By 9.30am load was at 7,158MW and by 11.30am it 
had increased to 7,618MW. The spot price had surged from $39.34 to $2,427/MWh. Demand increased by a 
further 374MW over the heat of the day and at 2pm spot price peaked at $9,154/MWh.
After detailed analysis of the bidding behaviour on the day, the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) instituted 
proceedings in the Federal Court against Stanwell Corporation for failing to act according to the good faith 
provisions in the National Electricity Rules to facilitate the efficient dispatch of available energy to meet  
demand. The case was dismissed (AER, 2011). As a result, we are left with the explanation that it was because 
it was a hot day that spot prices increased dramatically, in spite of adequate reserve capacity being available 
(AER, 2008). 
After solar panels – 2013
By the end of 2012, excess capacity in the National Energy Market (NEM) resulted in the mothballing of  
700MW at Tarong power station and the closure of Collinsville (180MW). FiTs, meanwhile, had encouraged the 
installation of 718MW of solar PV in Queensland. 
The summer of 2012/13 was a great deal hotter than 2007/08. The maximum temperature in Brisbane 
exceeded 30°C on 46 days, five of which were over 35°C. Saturday 19 January was a hot day which boasted  
a maximum temperature of 37.4°C. By 9am load was at 6,252MW and by 11.30am it had increased to 
6,829MW. The spot price, however, had reduced from $202.67 to $87.76/MWh. Demand increased a further 
697MW over the heat of the day, with spot price peaking at $544.18/MWh at 3.30pm. 
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expects increased interest in 
wind generation investment by 
around 2016, with a potential 
shortfall in capacity to meet the 
RET emerging in the second half 
of the decade (AEMO, 2012a). 
A number of large generators  
and retailers are actively lobbying 
to reduce the RET, which 
because of its expression in 
absolute terms and the reduced 
growth in energy consumption,  
is likely to exceed 20 percent 
significantly by 2020. Generators 
with investments in renewable 
energy complain that discussion 
around changing RET targets 
increases uncertainty and 
decreases investment.
Conclusions
Australian state and federal 
policies to encourage investment 
in renewable energy have 
delivered an additional 
10,800GWh of renewable energy 
(7,700 GWh from wind) since 
2000, increasing the proportion 
of renewable energy in the 
generation mix from nine percent 
to 13 percent. Much of this 
change has occurred since 2010, 
after the changes to the RET  
and the introduction of the Clean 
Energy Futures package.
Electricity price increases, 
meanwhile, have led to reduced 
demand and investment in 
rooftop solar. 
While the carbon price legislation 
encourages investment in gas-
fired generation and the RET 
encourages investment in wind 
power, there are few policy levers 
to encourage significant 
diversification to industrial scale 
solar power, storage, biomass 
and other forms of generation.
2.3.5. Comparisons 
In environments of uncertainty, 
investors must be offered 
security to ensure deployment  
of energy sources that will 
increase resilience. A benefit of 
reducing uncertainty is that the 
resulting greater security will  
lead to reduced premiums to 
cover risk. Policies that legislate 
to guarantee new technology 
generators access to the grid 
offer the greatest security to 
investors. The countries most 
successful at significantly 
diversifying generation have used 
FiT’s (and Feed-in-Premiums) 
and have focused on domestic 
and small business investors. 
Table 2 provides a summary of 
the main differences in the policy 
measures taken by the countries 
studied and resulting Power 
Resilience Index outcome. 
Table 2: Comparing country policy with resilience measures
California China Germany Australia
Main policy tool for 
diversification
RET 5 year plan FiT RET
Probability of energy 
from different fuel 
source
1990: 0.73
2010: 0.66
1990: 0.42
2010: 0.34
1990: 0.58
2010: 0.74
1990: 0.36
2010: 0.41
Energy from imported 
sources %
1990: 58%
2010: 61%
1990: 1%
2010: 2%
1990: 15%
2010: 54%
1990: –
2010: –
Carbon emissions  
gCO2/kWh
1990: 313
2010: 268
1990: 792
2010: 723
1990: 240
2010: 183
1990: 815
2010: 841
Spare capacity 
kWh/$
1990: 0.14
2010: 0.16
1990: 0.2
2010: 0.27
1990: 0.11
2010: 0.11
1990: 0.22
2010: 0.18
Non-renewable energy 
usage (tonnes of oil/
GWh)
1990: 127
2010: 110
1990: 258
2010: 220
1990: 240
2010: 183
1990: 258
2010: 278
Composite resilience 
index
1990: 0.45
2010: 0.54
1990: 0.32
2010: 0.44
1990: 0.33
2010: 0.45
1990: 0.31
2010: 0.33
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Some of the findings include:
•  California has increased its 
resilience as a result of a shift 
to gas, which has reduced 
emissions and non-renewable 
fuel usage. The California 
Energy Commission, however, 
remains concerned about its 
reliance on gas, which renders 
it vulnerable to global energy 
volatility.
•  China’s increase in resilience is 
largely due to improved 
efficiency of its coal-fired fleet, 
which has reduced energy 
usage and carbon emissions. 
•  Germany has improved 
resilience because of a shift to 
gas and renewable energies, 
which have decreased 
emissions and non-renewable 
fuel usage. 
•  Australia has seen little 
improvement in resilience.
•  Germany and China have been 
most effective at increasing 
their resilience since 1990.
Figure 8 demonstrates the 
impact of policies on retail prices. 
Unfortunately, price data for 
China is not readily available. 
Recent price rises in Australia 
reflect the impact of network 
expenditure to meet stringent 
reliability standards and an 
inflexible network pricing 
regulatory structure, more than 
policies to diversify and 
decarbonise the generation fleet. 
The cost of Germany’s 
Energiewende or Energy 
Transformation is hotly debated. 
Some people believe it places an 
unacceptable financial burden on 
the network companies which 
must pay to transmit wind power 
across the country; upgrade the 
distribution network to support 
solar panel deployment; and 
reduce wholesale costs.
However, proponents of the 
system claim that renewable 
energy has created a 
manufacturing base and a 
‘prosumer’ model for energy with 
high levels of individual 
ownership and that electricity 
retailers and industrial consumers 
have benefitted from the resulting 
wholesale prices. They point to 
residential consumers bearing 
the cost of the renewable energy 
surcharge and those residential 
consumers show high levels of 
support for the transformation 
despite the cost to them (TNS 
Infratest and Renewable Energy 
Agency, 2012). 
Whatever the views on the costs, 
Germany is engaged in a 
transition to a more diverse 
power system. Considering the 
conflict that has emerged 
between large industry and small 
private generators, it makes 
sense to seek to avoid much of 
the complexity that the German 
implementation has exposed.  
A more managed transition to 
greater diversity should attempt 
to support the industry to make 
the transition rather than pit 
industry against small domestic 
actors. The coherent long term 
policy framework for Australia 
must focus on a managed 
transition to a more resilient 
power system at the lowest 
possible cost, rather than a 
revolution. 
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A transition to resilient  
power
3.
Maximising diversity of generation at the 
lowest possible cost should be the major goal 
for power in Australia.
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Australia is heavily reliant on 
generating electricity from coal. 
This places its electricity industry 
and its economy in a vulnerable 
position in the event of global 
action on climate change or 
steep increases in coal price. 
Germany faced a similar  
dilemma in the early 1990s, and 
has put in place two key groups 
of policies to help it transition 
towards energy independence, 
international competitiveness  
and climate change mitigation. 
These are:
1.  Incentives for energy from 
renewable sources 
2.  Government funding for 
research to underpin 
affordability and innovation 
This combination of policies has 
directed investment towards a 
variety of new technologies and 
investors, underpinning a new 
industry funded largely by small 
private investors and residential 
consumers. 
Germany’s reliance on imported 
fuels and concerns over  
nuclear power has driven a 
challenging, and some would  
say overambitious, timetable to 
implement a power system 
founded on new technologies 
even as the technologies are still 
under development in 
laboratories. For now, the 
majority of the German public still 
supports this ideal. 
Australia must also face the 
challenge of transforming its 
power system to make it more 
resilient, although it should learn 
from the German experience  
and support its electricity 
industry through a transition, 
rather than drive a revolution. 
Australia has a number of 
advantages over Germany in 
transforming its power system. 
The advantages include:
•  Australian power is not 
dependent on energy  
imported from distant 
countries subject to global 
energy price volatility. 
Continuing to use domestic 
coal as a low cost fuel for 
legacy generation, until a full 
transformation to low carbon 
generation is affordable,  
can help balance the higher 
investment costs of the new 
technologies. 
•  Australia has superior 
renewable energy resources 
which will make electricity 
generated from renewables 
more affordable. 
•  Australia has a highly 
advanced resources sector 
that will be instrumental in 
transporting and sequestering 
carbon dioxide (CO2) once 
carbon capture becomes 
affordable. 
Despite these advantages, 
Australian energy policy lacks a 
long-term commitment to targets 
that recognise the requirement to 
reduce CO2 emissions by 
adopting a portfolio approach to 
energy generation, at the same 
time as inventing new ways to do 
business and drive the economy, 
with a reduced dependency on 
fossil fuels.
The Energy White Paper 
discusses the benefit of investing 
in energy innovation but is 
defined more by its support for 
privatisation and the 
development of fossil fuel 
(especially gas) resources rather 
than its long term strategy for 
security, climate change 
mitigation, international 
competitiveness and alternative 
industry development.  
The Liberal/National Coalition 
Government proposes to replace 
the carbon price and Clean 
Energy Future legislation with its 
Direct Action Plan which as yet 
offers limited detail on how it will 
address climate change 
mitigation and international 
competitiveness. 
Both Germany and China have 
achieved their objectives in 
energy production over the last 
decade. China’s implementation 
success is enhanced by having  
a command economy that is 
directed according to strategic 
goals, while Germany has 
implemented policy that has 
resulted in industry upheaval.  
To achieve its objectives, 
Australia needs to invest in 
research and development in 
renewable energy,  
geo-sequestration and increase 
its nuclear energy skill set with 
the goal of creating new 
industries. At the same time, 
Australia must set goals around 
its generation diversity and CO2 
emissions from electricity 
generation. In Part 2 of this 
series, we found that resilience is 
best pursued through a portfolio 
approach to power generation. 
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Maximising diversity of 
generation at the lowest possible 
cost, therefore, should be the 
major goal for power in Australia. 
To implement this diversification 
strategy, funding for research, 
development and deployment 
needs to be committed and 
protected from political 
interference. At the same time, 
incentives should be continued 
to facilitate the measured roll-out 
of technologies currently 
available. However, instead of 
forcing electricity consumers to 
pay additional amounts for 
Feed-in-Tariffs, the program 
should be funded directly from 
existing carbon price revenue. 
To achieve a competitive and 
resilient power system,  
Australian strategy needs to 
focus on:
•  Increasing the diversity of its 
energy fleet
•  Decreasing the carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions of its energy 
fleet
•  Increasing the security of its 
fleet through robust storage 
options
•  Improving the distribution 
efficiency of its power system
Specific policy measures to 
achieve these goals should:
•  Reduce reliance on coal-fired 
generation. The Renewable 
Energy Target (RET) and the 
carbon price legislation have 
been fairly successful in 
encouraging investment in 
alternative forms of generation, 
although potential changes to 
both of these policy levers 
threaten their ongoing 
effectiveness, and the current 
structures of the RET and carbon 
price do not encourage 
investment in energy sources 
other than wind and gas.
•  Regulate that new coal-fired 
plant can only be licensed if it 
meets world class efficiency 
and environmental standards 
and is fitted with CCS.
•  Invest in community 
consultation with respect to 
acceptance of nuclear power, 
and the siting studies and 
regulatory frameworks  
required to enable a future 
option for nuclear power 
generation.
•  Encourage participation in 
global research and 
development communities 
where a technological option 
exists but is as yet too 
expensive or too immature to 
deploy. This will keep the 
options open while Australia 
benefits from the knowledge 
gained from the combined 
research efforts of a multitude 
of larger nations.
•  Foster bipartisan support to 
fund and direct the  
deployment of those 
technologies available now to 
benefit from increased diversity 
of generation, as well as 
reduced carbon emissions.
•  Pursue pragmatic actions by 
using small, incremental steps 
(which are simpler to fund and 
implement than large, 
transformative change) to work 
towards the strategic goal of 
greater power system 
resilience. 
3.1. Implementing 
incentives to deliver a 
resilience strategy
With much of the coal-fired 
generation fleet nearing 
retirement within the next 
decade, Australia has an 
excellent opportunity to replace 
the ageing, inefficient and carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emitting plant with 
efficient, low carbon emissions 
generators. However, low carbon 
technology investment requires 
support because generation with 
low CO2 emissions comes at a 
cost premium which will require 
funding.
Generally, customers ultimately 
fund investment in electricity 
provision. However, to divert 
investment from high CO2 
emitting plants to low CO2 
emitting plants, economists have 
proposed a carbon price which 
seeks to even out the costs of 
generation between the plants, 
and, therefore, remove the cost 
premium associated with the 
non-polluting plant. The carbon 
price functions as an input cost 
added to represent the cost of 
CO2 emissions. Whether it takes 
the form of a government tax or 
price determined by market 
subject to government-set 
emissions constraints (i.e. an 
Emissions Trading Scheme or 
ETS), has been the subject of 
much debate. Although 
Australian electricity customers 
have already started funding the 
investment required for the 
transformation to a low-carbon 
economy through the carbon 
price, most of those funds have 
been diverted to other initiatives. 
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3.1.1 The emissions trading 
and carbon tax theories
There is substantial evidence  
that environmental taxes have 
successfully reduced pollution 
but little evidence that ETS have 
been successful. The United 
States (US) Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) 
program was the first 
implementation of an ETS in 
1995 and the basis for the belief 
that an ETS will deliver 
abatement at lowest cost.  
It provided permits to emit SO2 
to generators at no cost.  
This system encouraged fuel 
cost switching to reduce 
emissions of SO2, but did not 
deliver changes in technology,  
a requirement for carbon 
abatement. 
The primary example of CO2 
trading in operation, the 
European Union (EU) ETS has 
shown no ability to reduce 
emissions since its 
implementation in 2005. In the 
initial stages of the EU ETS, 
emission allowances were given 
free of charge to power 
generators. The opportunity cost 
of emission allowances was 
priced into wholesale costs 
leading to windfall profits for 
generators. However, the real 
structural problem with the EU 
ETS was that it set unchallenging 
quotas for emissions which led 
to an excess of emission 
allowances and low permit 
prices. The scheme was 
hindered by further complications 
as the global economic 
slowdown reduced electricity 
demand, generation and hence 
CO2 emissions which has led to 
a growing surplus of permits and 
further reduced their market 
value. Uncertainty about the 
appropriate level of emission 
quotas has rendered the EU ETS 
ineffective in reducing emissions 
and the low permit price has 
failed to shift generation to more 
efficient but expensive 
technologies.
In effect, the outcome of the EU 
ETS was predicted by Martin 
Weitzman’s research decades 
ago when he demonstrated that 
in states of uncertainty, it is 
necessary to have policies that 
involve both price and quantity 
control to be effective (Weitzman, 
1978). Weitzman continues to 
publish his research into the long 
chain of structural uncertainties 
that are overlooked in current 
climate change economics.  
He highlights that the extreme 
outcomes associated with 
climate change favour more 
aggressive policies to lower 
greenhouse gas emissions 
(Weitzman, 2011, Weitzman, 
2012). A practical application of 
Weitzman’s findings therefore 
implies that an incentive for 
investment must accompany a 
carbon price (either tax or ETS) 
to overcome the paralysing effect 
of uncertainty. 
3.1.2 Gaps between theory 
and applications in the real 
world
Whilst the EU ETS has had little 
success in reducing emissions 
and diversifying to new 
technologies for electricity 
generation, European countries 
in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), in particular Germany, 
have had significant success with 
diversifying the source of fuel for, 
and reducing emissions from, 
electricity generation through the 
application of Feed in Tariffs (FiTs) 
over many years. Applying FiTs 
over and above the opportunity 
cost of the emissions permits 
has effectively meant that 
German residential consumers 
have paid twice for carbon 
emissions. This shows then that 
a carbon price is useful but not 
sufficient to deliver the primary 
energy and technological 
changes required to reduce CO2 
emissions. 
The Climate Change Levy (CCL) 
on electricity consumption in the 
United Kingdom (UK) provided 
an early warning of the gaps 
between the predictions of 
economic theory and experience 
from the real world. After the 
introduction of the CCL, firms did 
not reduce electricity usage 
when the prices increased as a 
result of the levy. Instead, it was 
found that they needed additional 
incentives to invest, change 
behaviour and reduce electricity 
consumption. Investment in 
low-carbon electricity generation 
in Australia has shown similar 
tendencies. For this reason, 
generators, distributors and 
retailers who are prepared to risk 
adopting new technology that will 
benefit society in the future 
should be compensated for the 
additional risk (and costs) that 
they are taking on.
The introduction of the carbon 
price in July 2012 provided 
Australia with a funding 
mechanism to pay for new 
technology incentives. However, 
much of the revenue has been 
diverted into compensation to 
consumers for electricity price 
Generators, distributors and retailers who  
are prepared to risk adopting new technology 
that will benefit society in the future should  
be compensated.
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increases. A carbon price in the 
form currently legislated in 
Australia is not the only possible 
mechanism for funding 
investment to deliver reduced 
emissions from the provision of 
power. There are many 
alternatives for effectively funding 
investment in abatement, 
including an initiative like the  
UK’s Climate Change Levy on 
electricity consumption, or a  
tariff on consumption based on 
aggregated CO2 emissions 
across all goods and services.
The benefit of the carbon price 
legislation is that it is already 
enacted in law, included in 
electricity prices and generating 
revenue. Any new or different 
funding mechanism would 
re-introduce uncertainty for 
investors, planners and providers 
of electricity which ultimately will 
increase the cost of transforming 
the power system to increase its 
resilience.
3.1.3 Plugging the gap 
between the theory and real 
world application
While Germany’s FiTs delivered 
diversity at high costs which 
were passed on to residential 
consumers, Spain’s FiTs have 
delivered diversity at a very high 
cost to utilities which have not 
been able to pass on the costs 
to consumers. To manage this 
challenge in Australian, the 
Australia Capital Territory (ACT) 
enacted the Electricity Feed-in 
(Large-scale Renewable Energy 
Generation) Bill 2011 to promote 
the deployment of large-scale 
renewable technologies (more 
than 2MW but less than 210MW) 
that will reduce reliance on 
non-renewable fuels and address 
emission reduction targets at a 
reasonable cost to consumers. 
Investors that seek to provide 
renewable energy to distributors 
in the ACT participate in an 
auction to provide renewable 
energy at specified FiTs. The 
difference between the ACT’s FiT 
Case study 
Electricity market reform in the United Kingdom
Through its Electricity Market Reform policy, the UK Government seeks to deliver secure energy and drive 
ambitious action on climate change. In so doing, it is addressing both security of supply and climate change 
challenges while maximising the benefits and minimising the costs for consumers and taxpayers. A lack of 
investment in electricity infrastructure over the last decade means that the market reform needs to encourage 
huge investment in electricity infrastructure. This is in the face of pervasive uncertainty caused by high upfront 
capital costs, risks associated with deploying early stage technologies, gas and carbon price volatility. Their view 
is that they cannot rely on any single form of generation and that they need to pursue a portfolio approach to 
balance the risks and uncertainties through a diverse mix of technologies and fuel sources.
The Electricity Market Reform policy introduces two new market mechanisms:
• Long-term Contracts for Difference (CfDs), which include FiTs
• Capacity Markets to provide reliable capacity and security of supply
The mechanisms are supported by a tax on fossil fuels used to generate electricity, called the carbon price 
floor, which underpins the EU ETS and an Emissions Performance Standard. The carbon price floor prevents 
investment in coal fired generation without carbon capture and storage (CCS).
Unlike Germany’s FiTs, FiTs under CfDs  are intended for large generators rather than small residential, 
community and commercial investors. They seek to provide certainty for both generators in revenue 
projections and the system operator in paying for diverse and low-carbon energy in long-term contracts. 
The UK Government seeks, therefore, to facilitate substantial investment in low-carbon generation through 
removing exposure to electricity price volatility, stabilising returns for generators; lowering the capital cost for 
generators; retaining short-term market signals for efficient operation; and reducing the cost impost for consumers.
In principle, the CfD will be standardised across technologies although it is understood that initially there will be 
variations in recognition of their different risk profiles. While the plan is to shift to technology-neutral auctions in 
the future, in the first implementation technology quotas the government will set the “strike price” (the agreed 
price to a generator for the term of the contract). 
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system and Germany’s FiT 
system is that the ACT employs 
Contracts for Difference (CfD), 
that is payment to generators at 
the sum accepted at auction, 
less the National Electricity 
Market (NEM) spot price when 
the energy is sold into the 
market. 
The use of CfDs provides 
certainty for both the distributor 
who is required to buy the energy 
from the generator, and the 
generator who requires a clear, 
stable and predictable revenue 
stream from a new technology 
and fuel source. The UK has also 
proposed to contract for low-
carbon generation to institute 
market reform to decarbonise  
the electricity sector and focus 
on new generation investment  
(see “Electricity market reform in 
the United Kingdom” case study).
FiTs with CfD ensure that the 
deployment of diverse 
technologies can be carefully 
managed within a defined 
budget, funded by a carbon price 
or carbon consumption tax,  
such that consumers are not 
subjected to significant price  
rises like those that German 
residential consumers 
experienced. We propose to call 
these differentiated Power 
Purchase Agreements (dPPA), 
since they are targeted at industry 
rather than domestic investors.
3.1.4 Real world incentives 
for diverse energy in 
Australia
Given diversity is at the heart of a 
shift to resilience, it is important 
to provide a framework to secure 
that diversity. Until July 2012, 
Australia’s NEM has made no 
provision for externalities 
associated with CO2 emissions, 
which meant that generation 
tended towards cheap coal. 
However, a lack of growth in 
demand as a result of sharply 
increasing electricity prices and 
Renewable Energy Targets (RET) 
and FiTs generated investment 
has reduced any requirement for 
investment in coal-fired 
generation. In its current form, 
the RET has made no provision 
for diversity other than a 
requirement for renewable 
energy. Currently, wind power is 
the most mature renewable 
energy technology and provides 
the cheapest way to meet the 
target. While wind and solar 
photovoltaic (PV) power provide 
a start toward diversification, 
without significant storage or 
complementary generation to 
smooth the delivery of energy 
according to load, their 
intermittency reduces their 
usefulness within the electricity 
system. Emerging technologies 
like solar thermal with storage,  
or just storage, can substantially 
overcome the intermittency and 
scheduling issues.
To increase the resilience of its 
power system, Australia needs to 
take into account the following 
objectives when replacing retiring 
plant or meeting demand growth:
• Increased diversity of its fleet
•  Decreased emissions from its 
fleet
•  Increased absorptive capacity 
(e.g. storage) within its fleet
•  Improved distribution efficiency 
of its power system by 
deploying distributed energy
Incentives for investment in new 
technologies should be ranked 
according to these key resilience 
benefits and costs. For instance, 
while wind power would meet 
the first two objectives of 
resilience listed here it would be 
less desirable than solar thermal 
power with storage which would 
meet three of the four objectives. 
Storage or network ancillary 
services would meet all of the 
power system objectives making 
it highly attractive, although at 
this stage, very expensive. 
Therefore, when there are 
constraints or choices to be 
made, decision making should 
be based on an assessment of 
which option supplies the highest 
adherence to resilience targets at 
the lowest possible cost.
3.1.5 Why we need to 
fund differentiated Power 
Purchase Agreements from 
a carbon price
Firms that emit CO2 have to pay 
for their emissions, so coal-fired 
and gas-fired generators face the 
following profit equation:
Profit =  
Revenue − Operational costs − 
Carbon costs (carbon price)
The carbon price raises the 
funds corresponding to the 
environmental cost of CO2 
emissions. We are paying the 
carbon price to encourage 
efficiency in end-use and 
investment in technologies that 
have a lower environmental 
impact. These low-carbon 
generation technologies are 
more expensive because they 
are novel and untried, and face 
the following profit equation:
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Profit =  
Revenue − Operational costs −  
Early adopter costs 
With evidence that pursuing 
funded incentive schemes has 
resulted in multiple successes in 
reducing environmental costs,  
it is sensible to apply those 
principles again. On this basis,  
it is logical to use the carbon 
costs to fund the early adopter 
costs through dPPAs.
Under the current legislation, 
Australia uses the bulk of its 
carbon price revenue (carbon 
costs) to fund tax reductions for 
low-income consumers to pay 
for electricity price rises that the 
carbon price has caused. 
However, RET costs result in 
consumers having to pay the 
early adopter costs in addition to 
the carbon price, as has 
happened in Germany, inflating 
prices unnecessarily. So, in its 
current form in Australia, the 
carbon price is a redistributive 
tax and the RET is an 
environmental tax. It would be 
considerably more effective, 
understandable for consumers 
and prudent for balancing 
budgets if the carbon price only 
encouraged deployment of 
low-carbon technologies rather 
than supported other social 
mechanisms. If the carbon price 
is applied to early adoption of 
new technologies, then the 
impact on low-income earners 
will also be reduced.
The challenge is to calculate and 
deliver the subsidy required for 
early adopter costs, accurately 
and effectively, encouraging 
investment in multiple 
technologies ready for 
deployment, and reducing the 
risk of investing heavily in only 
one alternative. Each new 
technology will have a different 
early adopter cost, so it is 
important to establish different 
categories of dPPA. Auctions or 
tenders for each category of 
dPPA are the best way to ensure 
transparency by firms since firms 
will compete with each other to 
be awarded dPPA rather than 
engage in strategic behaviour to 
improve their profit margins at 
the public’s expense.
3.1.6 How it might work
Independence from political 
intervention
To avoid short-term manipulation 
of policies and targets, it is 
essential that abatement is 
managed outside of the political 
framework. An independent 
regulator needs to set targets, 
manage auction/tenders,  
collect carbon price revenues 
and conclude contractual 
arrangements with new 
technology generators. 
Planning for the cost of 
differentiated Power 
Purchase Agreements
The independent regulator  
would analyse tenders received 
from firms and preside over the 
allocation of early adopter 
subsidies (dPPAs) with an 
indicative control cost to guide 
acceptability of the bids 
calculated as follows:
Early adopter subsidy (dPPA) =  
Capital cost of the new  
technology plant
Projected lifetime energy 
supplied to the network of 
the new technology plant
Capital cost of the 
benchmark technology plant
Projected lifetime energy 
supplied to the network of 
the benchmark technology 
plant
–
We suggest the benchmark 
technology is Super Critical 
Pulverised Brown Coal (SCPf) as 
this is a mature technology with  
a fuel that has close to zero 
opportunity cost internationally.
To ensure that the dPPA does 
not become a potential loss for 
society, it should only be paid to 
generators for power produced 
during the economic life of the 
plant, not for the funding of 
development. 
With SCPf as the benchmark, 
indicative values for dPPA based 
on Australian Energy Technology 
Assessments (BREE, 2012) are 
detailed in Table 3.
Providing each new technology 
generator with an appropriate 
early adopter premium would 
facilitate the deployment of 
multiple new technologies from 
multiple new sources of energy, 
thus increasing the diversity and 
resilience of the generation fleet.
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A managed reduction in 
emissions through 
commercial deployment
The Australian Government has 
announced its intention to reduce 
its emissions from its power fleet 
by 80 percent by 2050 (unless it 
chooses to outsource Australia’s 
abatement responsibility and  
buy emissions reductions from 
developing countries). Without 
the certainty of being able to 
implement a backstop 
technology like CCS and/or 
nuclear power, which would 
continue to render Australian 
power vulnerable to the 
shortcomings associated with 
single fuel reliance anyway,  
a measured approach would be  
to seek to decrease emissions 
by, say, two percent per year.  
To do this, Australia would need 
to displace around 4.5mtCO2 
per year which would equate to 
around 3.2TWh per year of 
brown coal generation. Table 4 
below outlines how 3.2TWh of 
generation might be directed 
towards diverse fuels and 
technologies.
Funding an annual reduction 
would depend on the availability 
of funds raised from the carbon 
price. A fixed carbon price  
would provide more certainty  
for business and the funding of 
abatement targets, whilst the 
revenue generated from 
participating in an international 
carbon trading scheme would 
introduce uncertainty into both 
compliance and abatement 
costs. Therefore, the regulator 
should set an annual abatement 
target, with auctions held in each 
technology/fuel group that is able 
to deliver power. 
As an example, emission 
reduction could be sought from 
the following groups:
• Solar
• Marine
• Geothermal
• Storage/network augmentation
• Nuclear (small modular reactor)
• CCS
If 3.2TWh of annual brown coal 
fired generation was replaced, 
auctions could be held in each of 
the six groups for contracts to 
deliver 500GWh per year of 
generation. 
The funding requirements for a 
progressive annual roll-out of  
this sort for a period of five years 
would amount to a total of  
$3.6 billion and would then have 
a 20-year contract roll-out cost of 
a further $20.4 billion against 
$22.9 billion raised in five years 
(assuming a carbon price of $23/
tCO2 increasing by 2.5 percent 
per year in real terms) from 
electricity generation emissions 
only. This is as close as it gets to 
a balanced budget for a 10 
percent reduction in emissions, 
and a 17 percent increase in 
diversity of, electricity generation. 
Without a fixed carbon price, the 
regulator would have to estimate 
the budget available and 
negotiate contracts appropriate 
to that budget.
With an inbuilt renewable energy 
target as part of the subsidy 
scheme, we suggest that the 
RET can be discarded as a 
policy measure after 2020.
Table 3: Feed-in-Tariff indicative values
Available now Available post 2025
Fuel/technology dPPA ($/MWh) Fuel/technology dPPA ($/MWh)
Wind $6.06 CCS (Retrofit) $27.86
PV $41.01 Geothermal $33.93
CST (with storage) $65.34 Marine $43.84
Storage Not yet available Nuclear (Small 
modular reactor)
$3.35
Note: These values would need to be revised with every iteration to capture cost 
reductions as technologies mature.
Table 4: Contracts to deliver managed abatement
Solar Geothermal Marine Storage Nuclear CCS
GWh required 500 500 500 500 500 500
MW Capacity 136 68 161 160 68 100
FiT $/MWh $50 $34 $44 $318 $3 $28
Funding/yr ($m) $25 $17 $22 $159 $3 $14
3.2 What others have 
said
In July 2012, the Grattan Institute 
released a report entitled 
“Building the bridge: A practical 
plan for a low cost, low-
emissions energy future”.  
The report highlighted the need 
for government to intervene to 
remove the uncertainty that 
currently inhibits decisions to 
invest in renewable and low 
carbon generation.  
The centrepiece mechanism 
– the “bridge” to deploy a 
portfolio of technology options 
– is a regular auction system to 
contract with companies to 
generate electricity from low-
emission technologies. 
While there are differences 
between our proposals and the 
Grattan Institute’s auction 
system, the concepts are similar. 
Both suggest a portfolio 
approach to focusing investment 
on a diverse range of 
technologies with funding to 
support early investors who 
compete to provide the lowest 
cost generation within their 
technology or fuel group.  
Where the mechanisms appear 
to differ, is that our report sees 
no purpose in linking support for 
investors to a global carbon price 
which will provide investors with 
little certainty. We believe that 
more structured abatement 
would provide stronger targets 
for reduction rather than the 
unchallenging targets suggested 
by the Grattan Institute. 
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3.3 Research to 
underpin affordability 
and innovation in 
energy
It is widely accepted that 
innovation is critical for economic 
growth and a vibrant and 
productive society. However, 
successful innovation needs to 
proceed from idea creation 
through pilot-scale demonstration 
of viability and scaled-up 
production before being able to 
reap the benefits from 
commercial production and 
economies of scale. This is 
particularly the case in the clean 
energy space where good ideas 
abound but true innovation 
through to scaled-outcome is a 
rare event. The Cutler Report for 
the Rudd government’s National 
Innovations Systems Review 
highlighted a global and systemic 
funding gap in the availability of 
capital for immature ventures 
where research points to the 
potential but commercial 
application remains uncertain 
(Cutler, 2008). This is supported 
by a recent Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) 
Taskforce report which identified 
a decline in innovation production 
competency in the US, pointing 
to financial market requirements 
for “asset light” companies as a 
compelling factor in propelling 
corporations to reduce long-term 
research and resource 
commitment to scale-up to 
commercialisation in favour of 
heightened near term returns 
(MIT Taskforce, 2013). 
In the Preview of the MIT 
Production in the Innovation 
Economy Report (PIE), innovation 
resources in the US are 
compared with those in Germany. 
It finds Germany’s manufacturing 
industry is rich in ‘complementary 
capabilities’, with trade 
associations, research consortia, 
university-led collaborations and 
technical advisory committees 
facilitating critical scale-up stages 
like prototyping, pilot production, 
demonstration and early 
manufacturing. This makes it 
successful in delivering the 
economic benefits from 
innovation. 
Germany’s ability to transform  
its old manufacturing  
capabilities into new innovations 
is a result of its long-term 
commitment to nurturing 
innovation. This commitment is 
exemplified in its Sixth Energy 
Research Programme which 
identifies investment in 
technologies around energy 
efficiency and renewable energy 
as critical to the future in a 
carbon-constrained world. 
Almost 80 percent of Germany’s 
federal research funding in 2014 
is reserved for energy-related 
research and development to 
meet both their need for secure, 
affordable energy and to  
mitigate against climate change. 
The German Government  
does not shoulder this cost and 
responsibility on its own;  
almost 70 percent of gross 
domestic expenditure on 
research and development is 
financed by industry (Federal 
Ministry of Economics and 
Technology, 2011). 
The Cutler Report found that 
Australia’s ‘absorptive capacity’, 
that is the country’s ability to 
realise the value of unfolding 
research findings and apply them 
to commercial ends, is 
increasingly fragile. Expecting to 
free-ride on global technological 
developments will fail to increase 
the diversity and range of 
innovative skills, manufacturing 
capacity, investments and firms  
in the Australian economy. 
Success in deriving economic 
benefit from research conducted 
in Australia is dependent on 
building ‘complementary 
capabilities’ like those found in 
Germany. In clusters of innovation 
in the US, MIT’s PIE report found 
that successful innovation is 
characterised by building 
‘complementary activities’ like: 
•  Convening, where a private 
company or a public institution 
takes the lead in providing 
resources for others to use and 
from which to gain benefit
•  Co-ordinating, where existing 
resources are coupled with 
research or novel concepts 
from diverse sources
•  Pooling and sharing risk 
amongst collaborators
•  Bridging the gap to 
commercialisation
What is striking about these 
‘complementary activities’ is that 
they provide a service which 
becomes a public good, but is 
not funded by the market. In the 
successful clusters in the US  
and in Germany, the responsibility 
for providing this public good is 
accepted by both public and 
private concerns. 
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To be competitive in the decades 
to come, Australia needs to 
increase the resilience of its 
power system, and actively  
foster ‘absorptive capacity’ of its 
renewable energy and CCS 
potential. The institutional 
structure for funding research, 
development and deployment of 
immature renewable energy 
technologies is developing 
through the Australian Renewable 
Energy Agency (ARENA), and 
CCS through Australian National 
Low Emissions Coal Research 
and Development (ANLEC R&D). 
However, there is little institutional 
capability to co-ordinate and 
deliver the prototypes, pilots, 
demonstrations and early 
manufacturing capacity. 
Singapore has established 
A*STAR, the Agency for Science, 
Technology and Research, which 
seeks to support Singapore’s  
key economic clusters through 
Research Entities which place 
emphasis on translating new 
knowledge and technologies 
created at the “benches” into  
new workable applications; and 
commercialisation entities which 
facilitate the efficient transfer of 
A*STAR’s technologies to 
industry. A*STAR’s philosophy is 
indicative of broader Singaporean 
attitudes to innovation and new 
industry development. 
Singapore’s only resource is its 
people, and investment in 
intellectual capital is therefore 
paramount. A*STAR also actively 
“recruits” new technology and 
companies into Singapore, 
preferring to concentrate on 
metrics of skilled job creation 
rather than attempting to capture 
and own intellectual property 
which may or may not deliver an 
outcome, or indeed exploit an 
import for short term gain. It is 
not clear that Australia’s current 
innovation system of 
Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation 
(CSIRO), small government 
laboratories, isolated industry 
activity and competing 
universities can accommodate 
the type of philosophical shift 
needed to truly increase our 
innovative capacity and fully 
capitalise on an immense 
intellectual resource.
In the renewable energy space, 
ARENA is almost certainly a step 
in the right direction. Its mandate 
is to co-ordinate and promote 
innovation (technology, systems 
and processes) throughout the 
early stage of technology 
readiness levels (TRLs – Figure 9) 
through to pilot-scale realisation. 
In principle, ARENA should 
dovetail with the research and 
discovery focused activities of the 
National Research Councils (the 
Australian Research Council in 
particular); the early stage proof-
of-principle commercialisation 
focus of schemes like 
AusIndustry’s Clean Technology 
Innovation Program (CTIP),  
and the full-scale deployment 
support afforded under the Clean 
Energy Finance Corporation.  
An interesting aspect of ARENA’s 
current portfolio is the Renewable 
Energy Venture Fund (REVC) –  
a $200 million Venture Capital 
investment vehicle managed by 
the US-Australia Southern Cross 
Venture Capital (SXVP) with funds 
also provided by SoftBank China. 
Disappointingly, the REVC, which 
has been running for nearly two 
years now, has had a relatively 
modest deal flow, with only two 
announced investments to date: 
Brisbane Materials Technology 
Pty Ltd and Hydrexia Pty Ltd. 
Why, if Australians are so 
innovative, has the REVC had 
such limited impact?
At the other end of the scale, 
ARENA has now absorbed the 
Solar Flagships Program (SFP). 
The SFP was a Labor 
Government initiative which 
aimed to deploy up to 1GW of 
utility-scale solar thermal and 
solar PV in four plants over the 
next decade. The scheme was a 
grand vision, and attracted 
significant international interest for 
the world’s largest solar 
companies. Initially, $1.2 billion 
was sequestered in the SFP fund 
with a further $200 million 
allocated from the Education 
Investment Fund (EIF) to underpin 
research and development,  
as well as capacity building.  
The Solar Dawn and Moree Solar 
Farm consortia were the first 
successful projects to be chosen 
in a highly competitive round one 
tender process during 2011. 
However, neither project reached 
financial closure and both were 
abandoned by mid-2012 when 
the SFP was transitioned into 
ARENA’s portfolio. 
A further PV project, the AGL/
First Solar Nyngan-Broken Hill 
Project, was funded to replace 
the Moree Solar Farm and is 
expected to reach financial 
closure in July 2013. This project 
will deploy 159MW of flat panel 
PV (First Solar thin film cadmium 
telluride) at two NSW sites.  
The project will cost 
approximately $450m with 
approximately $200m of support 
from the Australian and NSW 
governments. The University of 
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Queensland will partner with the 
University of New South Wales in 
creating a large (3.25MW) 
research pilot plant at its Gatton 
Campus west of Brisbane.  
This will be Australia’s first 
national solar research facility for 
pilot-scale innovation and 
arguably the largest and most 
sophisticated of its kind 
anywhere. 
The eagerly anticipated success 
of the AGL PV project aside, the 
SFP demonstrated a somewhat 
obvious truth – renewable energy 
projects at the utility-scale 
whether subsidised by the public 
purse or not, require solid and 
financially viable off-take 
agreements. Both the Moree and 
Solar Dawn projects failed on this 
critical element. AGL, being a 
large retailer provides its own 
off-take. With the current 
regulatory and market structure in 
Australia, and with a small 
number of large, dominant 
retailers, does this mean that only 
parties that can buy their own 
energy via “internal power 
purchase agreements” or direct 
merchant trading will finance  
and build utility-scale renewable 
power plants? This is a critical 
policy and regulatory hurdle 
requiring a new level of market 
innovation.  
Since innovation in Australia’s 
productive capacity will deliver 
greater economic benefit,  
there is reasonable justification  
for funding programs that seek  
to increase innovation in energy 
from general revenue rather  
than tightly coupled to carbon 
price revenue. Inevitably, there  
will be some overlap between 
commercial deployment of new 
technologies and developing 
emergent technologies and  
while flexibility is needed to allow 
projects access to multiple 
programs, measures should be 
taken to avoid duplication in 
project funding from public 
money. 
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We strongly recommended that 
innovation is not limited to 
supporting the development and 
demonstration of renewable 
energy and distributed generation. 
The Clean Energy Future Plan 
provided funding for research, 
development and demonstration 
programs for CCS, i.e. the CCS 
Flagships program, the National 
Low Emissions Coal Initiative,  
the National CO2 Infrastructure 
Plan and funding for the Global 
CCS Institute. 
The CCS Flagships Program has 
$1.68 billion to support two-to-
four large-scale integrated CCS 
demonstration projects in 
Australia. Indicative priorities of 
the CCS Flagship projects 
include:
•  Multi-user infrastructure for 
greenhouse gas storage sites 
in high-emission regions,  
with pipeline infrastructure to 
support the transport of CO2 
from regional emissions 
sources
•  Integrated capture and storage 
projects that may include coal 
gasification, post-combustion 
capture and oxy-firing 
integrated with geological 
storage
These programs are supported 
by various state government 
programs and the Australian  
Coal Association Low Emissions 
Technologies (ACALET) Fund 
which will commit approximately 
$1 billion to the development of  
CCS and other low emissions 
coal utilisation technologies.  
Like the Solar Flagships  
program, the CCS Flagships 
program has also seen limited 
success with projection 
cancellations and delays.
Australia must prioritise the 
characterisation of CO2 
geo-storage resources. Such 
exploration and appraisal efforts 
take time and significant funding, 
and thus the continued provision 
for investment of this nature 
needs to be made as assured as 
possible. Equally importantly, if 
Australia wishes to lengthen the 
potential for its lucrative fossil fuel 
export market, is investment in 
the technological advancement of 
carbon capture from generators. 
Reducing carbon capture costs 
would provide significant 
opportunity for Australia to 
roll-out its innovations world-wide 
and benefit from a massive 
market opportunity to capture 
and store carbon from a global 
fleet of more than 1.7TW of 
coal-fired power stations. 
Similarly, developing the option to 
deploy nuclear power would 
guarantee greater diversity for 
Australian energy. Despite 
disagreement on the deployment 
of nuclear power, public 
perception could change quickly 
if the consequences of global 
warming assumed greater 
significance. To retain all options 
it is important to build ‘absorptive 
capacity’, invest in skills, 
knowledge and research into the 
safe provision of nuclear power. 
In summary, significant 
investment over several decades 
in our energy technology 
innovation system has failed to 
deliver substantive outcomes. 
Fragmented and uncoordinated 
state and federal policies, 
unilateral partisan positions in 
successive administrations,  
a stranglehold by the large 
incumbent retailers and suppliers, 
and a clumsy regulatory 
environment have conspired to 
suppress innovation and 
deployment. ARENA is an 
attempt to address these issues 
(for renewable energy only) and 
will hopefully enjoy a degree of 
consistency and bipartisan 
support to allow it to do its job 
and expand its mandate to 
support low emissions 
technologies more generally.
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Case study 
From evolution through collaboration to innovation
Figure 9 provides stylised view of the well-defined process moving through levels of technology readiness  
from idea creation and laboratory research through to full-scale exploitation.
Activities for developing ‘complementary capability’ need to be super-imposed on this framework to build 
‘absorptive capacity’. Figure 10 provides detail on how an innovation collaboration might be structured to deliver 
‘complementary capabilities’ to energy research, development and deployment.
Figure 9: Scaling up from ideas to exploitation
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Just as firms will not invest to 
reduce externalities unless 
regulation requires them to do 
so, few firms will invest in new, 
untried, diverse technologies 
unless some kind of incentive 
exists. Australia, therefore,  
needs to develop a strategic  
view of where it wants to be in 
2035 and establish policies that 
will help it get there. The UK’s 
Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, Chatham House, has put 
forward a concept which they 
refer to as ‘investment grade’ 
energy policy which is based on 
the concept that ‘financeability’ 
must be central to policy making 
where investment is a significant 
issue. This is because a simple 
‘low carbon’ approach or  
carbon price will not overcome 
the market risks associated with 
new technologies, or drive the 
underlying infrastructure 
requirements. Thus, Chatham 
House suggest that public 
finance tools for investment in 
infrastructure as well as support 
for innovation are essential to 
meet climate change goals 
(Hamilton, 2009).
In Part 2 of this series, we found 
that investment in renewable and 
distributed generation offered a 
strategy to increase resilience. 
We also highlighted that CCS 
and nuclear power could 
increase resilience, although  
the ability to deploy CCS and 
nuclear are dependent on 
research and development for 
CCS and addressing public 
skepticism about nuclear.  
A strategy to deploy a diverse 
range of renewable and 
distributed generation little by 
little over the next decade, 
coupled with characterisation  
of carbon geo-storage and 
geothermal resources would 
provide Australia with a 
manageable, funded and 
therefore affordable path toward 
a resilient and competitive power 
system.
Using an existing funding 
mechanism like the carbon price 
would help protect consumers 
from sharp increases in electricity 
prices. At the time of writing, 
both political parties are 
committed to maintaining current 
tax benefits to low-income 
earners, rolled out as part of the 
carbon price legislation, despite 
election commitments to change 
or abolish the carbon price.  
Both parties commit to fund the 
tax benefits through budget 
savings elsewhere in the event  
of reduced or no carbon price 
revenues. It seems there is 
bipartisan support for funding 
current tax benefits from outside 
the carbon price process.  
This tax subsidy scheme, 
therefore, effectively combines 
the divergent policies of the 
major Australian parties by 
coupling the carbon price 
mechanism of the Labor Party 
with the direct action plan of the 
Coalition. This way each party 
will have contributed a significant 
construct to a workable price 
and quantity mechanism that 
could deliver a resilient, 
competitive power system in the 
decades to come.
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